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Abstract   
 The purpose of this study is to investigate corporate governance’s 
quality for Shareholding Companies Listed on the Amman Stock Exchange; 
to see how corporate governance index (CGI) and firm performance and firm 
value are associated; and last but not the least is to check how CGI affects 
firm performance and firm value. A comprehensive CGI containing 112 
points was constructed and analyzed for years 2010 and 2015. It reported 
that the Jordanian industrial and service companies have a good CGI during 
these two years. Pearson correlation has showed positive but weak 
relationships between CGI and all variables in the two years. Multiple 
regression analysis was performed to evaluate corporate governance index 
effects on the performance and the value of firm. The results did not support 
the hypotheses that CGI significantly affects these two variables. To reach to 
better corporate governance in Jordanian industrial and service companies, 
the Jordanian authorities might need to modify the inconsistence between 
laws and corporate governance rules. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance index, firm value, firm performance, 
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Introduction 
 The corporate governance, in the last few years, has shown profound 
interest in the accounting literature. Corporate governance’s key purpose is 
to give direction to the organization and control it. Largely speaking, one can 
define corporate governance as "the stewardship responsibility of corporate 
directors to provide oversight for the goals and strategies of a company and 
foster their implementation" (Cornelius, 2005, P.583). It is also defined "as 
the system used to manage and control firms; it consists of a set of market 
and regulatory mechanisms which indicate how to manage a company, 
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including the relationships among different stakeholders and the objectives 
of the company" (Tu et al., 2014, P.175). 
 Regarding the initiation of the term of corporate governance, there is 
no clear cut time that refers to the foundation of the term of corporate 
governance. Nevertheless, it is a contemporary issue. Consequently, Bai et 
al. (2004:P.600) stated that "The emerging market crisis in 1997 and 1998 
rekindled worldwide interest in the issue of corporate governance". During 
the economic crisis times, link among the performance of firms and 
corporate governance was established by a few studies. For instance, it was 
suggested by Baek et al. (2004) that during the Korean financial crisis, the 
change in the value of a firm is a function of the firm-level differences in the 
measures of corporate governance. Mitton (2002) (as cited in Siagian, 2011) 
has found that if corporate governance is implemented in firms, during the 
economic crisis, they are in a better state. In Jordan, however, as an emergent 
country, we could also say that the scandals of international companies and 
financial crisis in 2008 have supported the growing interest of corporate 
governance in this country. 
 In the line with the arrangements and changes that happened in the 
world after a financial crisis, significant efforts have been made by the 
Jordanian government in making corporate governance better. According to 
Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), the Corporate Governance Code 
(CGC) guide was constructed by the efforts of JSC in order to establish the 
national capital market in Jordan, and also its organizational and regulatory 
structure (JSC, 2016). Therefore, this guide’s rules and regulations are 
mainly founded on several legislations, primarily the ASE Regulations, the 
Companies Law, the Securities Law and regulations related to that, and lastly 
OECD – Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
designed international policies (JSC, 2016). 
 However, JSC has decided on July 29, 2008, to approve CGC for 
Shareholding Companies Listed (SCL) on the Amman Stock Exchange 
(ASE) (here after "SCL on ASE"). It decided that this CGC must be effective 
in 1/1/2009. Besides, the Companies Control Department (CCD) in the 
Jordanian Ministry of Industry and Trade has issued CGC for the Private 
Shareholding Companies that are not for profit, Limited Liability 
Companies, Private Shareholding Companies, and unlisted Public 
Shareholding Companies in the stock exchange and for Limited Liability 
Companies that are not for profit. Once more, the JSC has announced the 
Public Shareholding Companies that: "a company's annual report for 2010 
should necessarily have a special independent chapter of implementing the 
‘Code’. However, this chapter will indicate to what extent compliance should 
be done with the guideline code items of the Corporate Governance Code for 
"SCL on ASE". In case of the inability to comply with any of the guideline 
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codes, the company must state which code and provide explanations" (JSC, 
2016). In addition, Jordanian Public Shareholding Companies must comply 
with Companies Law, ASE Regulations, Environmental Regulations, 
Investment Regulations, and other formal laws and regulations. 
 Subsequently, the industrial and services firm play an important role 
in Jordan's growing economy as they have in other emerging markets. 
Corporate governance, as it is widely mentioned, is supposed to positively 
affect a firm performance, and hence raising the firm value. Consequently, 
this study’s contribution which is the most important of all is a 
comprehensive quantitative measures' of the construction of corporate 
governance index (CGI). This is for the purpose of evaluating the corporate 
governance practices’ quality in "SCL on ASE". It is seeking to add latest 
empirical data and proofs on constructed CGI effects. In addition, it links to 
the firm value and the firm performance, especially in industrial and service 
companies. Furthermore, this study contributes to practical literatures about 
corporate governance in Jordan. Based on the knowledge of the researcher, 
no study as such has been applied to the same index on these companies. 
 Therefore, the focus of this study is on: First: CGI Construction is 
used as an alternative for corporate governance practice in "SCL on ASE". 
Second: To know, using constructed CGI, whether there an improvement in 
corporate governance practice in year 2015 compared to year 2010? Third: 
the link among corporate governance index for "SCL on ASE" and their rates 
as calculated by Tobin's Q to be established. Fourth: The link among 
corporate governance index for "SCL on ASE" and their performance as 
calculated by return on assets (ROA) to be established, and Fifth: To test the 
effect of CGI for "SCL on ASE" on both firm value and firm performance. 
 Once again, a composite corporate governance index (CGI) was 
developed containing 112 points classified under five major governance 
categories. All the four major aspects of corporate governance in Jordan have 
been captured in this index. Thus, this includes General Assembly Meetings, 
The Board of Directors, Disclosure & Transparency, and Shareholders 
Rights. These major aspects also have in details other aspects such as tasks 
and responsibilities, Meetings, audit committee, and external auditor. In 
addition, the index also contains "other general items" to capture the 
important elements included in the definitions in the CGC for ''SCL on 
ASE''. Also, this is with the aim that internal-control issues were 
incorporated. If examined by the researcher’s eye, this sub-index should be 
added to give more power to the constructed index for ''SCL on ASE''. The 
constructed index has two kinds of rules, namely: "Imperative and General 
rules" and "Guideline rules". As a result, a score of 60.5% has been 
determined as the minimum score to classify corporate governance as better 
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or good. Therefore, this score was based on the ratio of points given to 
imperative and is generally compared to the overall index's points. 
 This study has reported that the "SCL on ASE" have a good CGI in 
two years, 2010 and 2015. In addition, a significant difference in the scores 
for CGI in 2015 and CGI in 2010 was found. Thus, it suggests that the CGI 
for "SCL on ASE" has improved over time. Despite that, Weak relationships 
have been found between CGI and each and every variable that is employed 
in the study. Furthermore, the hypothesis that CGI affects firm's value and 
firm's performance was not supported by the results. 
 The organization of this paper is like this: A study and an overview 
of literature related to connection among corporate governance index, firm 
value, firm performance, and the development of the hypotheses was done in 
section 2. The data set and how corporate governance index was constructed 
for "SCL on ASE" was explained in section 3. The empirical results are 
explained in the section 4. Conclusion was done in section 5. Finally, the 
study limitations were explained in section 6. 
 
Review of Literature and Development of Hypotheses 
Corporate Governance Index  
 In recent years, corporate governance link to the variables such as 
firm performance. Thus, firm value has been of much interest in emerging as 
well as the developed markets. Majority of the prior studies in this field have 
conducted on the practices of the main aspects of corporate governance such 
as board composition, executive compensation, and ownership concentration. 
However, Cheung et al. (2014) refereed that inconclusive or contradictory 
data were provided by the past empirical studies regarding the supposed 
advantages in the case of the implementation of corporate governance 
practices that are good. From other side, reviewing the literatures in this 
field, we can see growing interest in building an overall corporate 
governance index toward achieving more corporate governance quality. In 
various countries, several empirical studies have made use of the indexes for 
quality assessment of corporate governance. As Cheung et al. (2014) 
describes, "The logic behind this approach is that corporate governance 
mechanisms may be substitutes for one another. Consequently, one must 
consider the overall quality of corporate governance when examining the 
impact on firm performance." Furthermore, this logic also can be applied 
when assessing how CGI influences the value of firm. 
 There are many approaches that addressed the construction of the 
corporate governance indices in different countries. Some of these indexes 
were built on a survey; a questionnaire or a checklist. Other indices were 
built and analyzed using weighted or unweighted scores based on secondary 
data such as annual financial reports. In Jordan, Zureigat (2015), using a 
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checklist designed to construct unweighted compliance index, found that 
Jordanian listed companies averagely act according to the governance rules 
that are compulsory. According to Zureigat (2015), the compliance level is 
significantly affected by a few important variables which include: age as a 
listed company on the ASE, company size, size of the auditor, type of 
industry, and profitability. 
 In contrast to the study conducted by Zureigat (2015), the purpose of 
this study is to serve as an assessment of what level of corporate governance 
in "SCL on ASE" is good in year 2015 (the last year before conducting the 
study) when compared to the year 2010 (the first year where the "SCL on 
ASE" were required to disclose the extent they comply with governance 
rules that was initiated by JSC). Consequently, it is supposed that CGI has 
improved over the years since 2010 until 2015. Therefore, the CGI for "SCL 
on ASE" were constructed for two years, 2010 and 2015, using 160 
questions which covers five sub-indexes. Based on this idea, the first 
hypothesis was drawn as follows: 
 H01: There is no difference between CGI for "SCL on ASE" in 
2015 and 2010. 
 
Corporate Governance Index and Firm Value 
 Several studies have been carried in order to establish the association 
among firm value and corporate governance index. Some of these studies 
were also carried out to examine how CGI affects the firm value. As it is 
mentioned previously in this study, the CG Indexes were built in different 
ways. Thus, here are some related studies. Gov-Score has been created by 
Brown and Caylor (2006), a summarized form of governance measure which 
is founded on 51 firm-specific requirements that characterize external as well 
as internal governance. Tobin’s Q is demonstrated as a firm value’s 
substitute, and it has positive relation with Gov-Score. Consequently, a wide 
corporate governance index is constructed by Beiner et al. (2006) to 
represent Swiss firms' samples. The common hypothesis that firm valuation 
and corporate governance are positively related is held up by outcomes of 
these studies. In Brazilian listed companies, Silva and Leal (2005) have 
constructed a broad firm-specific corporate governance index of 15 points. 
Therefore, they reported that Tobin’s Q and improved corporate governance 
practices are positively related. Thus, the results are insignificant 
statistically. 
 Ficici and Aybar (2012), using the Corporate Governance Scores of 
S&P for a 54 American Depositary Receipts (ADR) samples issuing 
emerging market firms (EMFs) from 9 countries, have shown that Tobin’s Q 
(firm’s market value) and emerging market MNEs total corporate 
governance scores is positively correlated. Siagian, Siregar and Rahadian 
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(2013) have developed a new corporate governance checklist based on: the 
Indonesian Institute of Corporate Directorship (IICD), index and checklist 
from S&P's, and National University of Singapore research. However, they 
obtained the financial data from the financial reports of JSX database. Their 
result demonstrates that corporate governance and firm value of various 
proxies are positively correlated, especially with institutional ownership. 
However, they did not discover the fact that firm value affects GCG practice. 
It is recommended using their results that higher CGI scoring firms have 
higher values. Also, it was suggested by Durnev and Kim (2005) that for the 
firms where better governance is practiced, the value is higher. This 
prediction was tested and approved using corporate governance practice’s 
quality data whose compilation is done by CLSA, whereas S&P disclosure 
data was used as a check for robustness. 
 Consequently, a firm-specific index for corporate governance quality 
was constructed by Ananchotikul (2008) to examine how foreign investment 
affects the corporate governance. She stated that "the fact that this index is 
positively correlated with firm value as well as with minority shareholdings 
further confirms the reliability of this index as a measure of the true quality 
of corporate governance." The values for this index range from 0 up to 100 
with better governance being indicated by higher values. It was founded by 
Siagian (2011) that the implementation of corporate governance is linked to 
the size of firm and its value. Hence, the firms which have high value and 
larger size are likely to have better implementation of corporate governance. 
He also stated: "my findings are consistent using both un-weighted and 
weighted CGI.” He added: "I also use different proxies for firm value and 
find that the results are consistent with the main results." 
 By focusing on the ratings of corporate governance in general for a 
wide variety of international firms, the Corporate Governance Quotient 
(CGQ) index is used by Krafft et al. (2013) from Risk Metrics/Institutional 
Shareholder Services to re-assess the connection among corporate 
governance, performance of firms, and its value. Therefore, they found that 
convergence claims, hypothetically speaking, showed a statistically strong 
and an economically significant correlation between governance, firm value 
and performance, and support the US top practice being adopted by non-US 
firms. 
 Using the survey of Indian firms for year 2006, a wide general Indian 
Corporate Governance Index (ICGI) was built by Balasubramanian et al. 
(2009). Thus, ICGI and market value of firm are found to be positively 
correlated. More importantly, Balasubramanian et al. (2009) found that using 
studies that are in harmony with the multi-country which covers the largest 
firms for each country only, the ICGI association with the market value of 
firm may extends to smaller firms as well and is stronger too. In this regard, 
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when Tu et al. (2014) analyzed the quality of corporate governance by assets 
size, they indicated that improved quality of CG is present in the bigger 
banks as compared to the smaller ones. Black, Carvalho and Gorga (2009) 
have found a significant association between governance and large (but not 
small) firms.  In another work, Black, Carvalho and Gorga (2012) reported 
other result. Here, they refer to the fact that small firms' market value is 
predicted by governance (but not for large). 
 Black (2001) conducted a study using 21 Russian firms sample. It 
was shown by his results that as measured by governance ranking and 
"ln(value ratio)", the correlation between firm value is statistically strong and 
striking too. Despite the fact that due to the fact that small sample results are 
tentative as referred by Black (2001), he recommends that for a country with 
cultural and legal constraints which is weak on corporate behavior, a good 
corporate governance behavior can have an influential impact on the market 
value. A Korean corporate governance index (KCGI, 0~100) was 
constructed by Black et al. (2006, p366) for 515 Korean companies which is 
based on Korea Stock Exchange survey for year 2001. However, they 
"reported strong OLS and instrumental variable evidence that an overall 
corporate governance index is an important and likely causal factor in 
explaining the market value of Korean public companies." In the same 
manner, Black et al. (2010) have constructed a multi-year KCGI from 1998 
to 2004. The KCGI is composed of five equally weighted subindices which 
are as follows: Ownership Parity, Board Structure, Board Procedure, 
Shareholders Rights, and Disclosure. It was revealed by them that firms with 
higher scores on an overall KCGI have higher Tobin's Q. In addition, Black, 
Carvalho and Gorga (2009) have used Brazilian firms' data from an early 
survey in 2005 for building the corporate governance index. It was 
highlighted by them that a higher lagged Tobin's Q was predicted by general 
index and subindices. This is with exception to "board independence" where 
it was found that it is negatively correlated to Tobin's Q. 
 A corporate governance index is constructed by Aman and Nguyen 
(2008), (as cited in Ushijima, 2015), which is a variable composed of fifteen 
factors that are obtained from the Nikkei-Cges (Corporate Governance 
Evaluation System). Ushijima (2015) has employed this index and added 
three sub-indices, namely, board of directors, equity ownership structure, and 
information disclosure. Thus, he found that corporate governance increases 
firm value, but this effect is attenuated for diversified firms. Furthermore, 
Ushijima (2015) mentioned that "The estimation results show that CG is an 
important determinant of the market value as well as industrial scope of 
Japanese firms." 
 In order to check the comprehensiveness and perfection of practices 
of “good” corporate governance as the Anglo-American paradigm set 
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examples, Griffin et al. (2015) used a Governance Metrics International 
(GMI) new database. Furthermore, three corporate governance indices were 
built by them, namely: minority shareholder protection, corporate behavior 
standards, and transparent disclosure. They found within countries, among 
firm-level corporate governance practices and performance of firm, the 
existence of a large positive association. Contrastingly, the association was 
largely negative across countries. It was concluded by them that the 
implementation of "good'' corporate governance practices by the firm is 
influenced by the national culture as well. It was investigated by Ammann et 
al. (2011), using dataset from GMI, what is the association among firm-level 
corporate governance and the value of firm. They constructed two alternative 
additives CGI with equal weights recognized as the 64 individual governance 
qualities and a principal component analysis to derive one index. Also, a 
positive and robust relation for all three indices was found by them between 
the valuation of firm and firm-level corporate governance. 
 From other side, some prior studies reported opposed results. ISS 
Governance QuickScore 2.0 overall rating is used by Gherghina et al. (2014) 
that are provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) to 
reflect the corporate governance practices for each and every company that is 
a part of S&P 100 Index. Therefore, only the companies involved in the 
financial sector were left as an exception. Inconsistent with prior studies, 
Gherghina et al. (2014) reveals association among the company value and 
corporate governance ratings to be statistically insignificant. 
 In brief, most of the previous studies on corporate governance reveal 
that there is a positive correlation between firm value and CGI. The 
examination of the connection between firm value for "SCL on ASE" and 
CGI, and to check how CGI affects the firm value, are two important 
purposes of this study. Consistent with prior studies, we use Tobin’s Q as a 
substitute for the value of firm. In accordance to this, the second hypothesis 
was drawn as follows: 
H02: The corporate governance index for "SCL on ASE" doesn't 
affect firm value in year 2010 and year 2015. 
 
Corporate Governance Index and Firm Performance 
 From other side, many studies have been conducted to establish how 
the CGI and performance of firms were linked. For instance, Moore and 
Porter (2007) have used a commercially produced index, the Corporate 
Governance Quotient (CGQ), to see how the cooperate governance and 
cooperate performance are linked. Their study concludes that there is no 
significant relationship between governance regime and cross-sectional 
variation occurring in the performance of firms. It was found by Epps and 
Cereola (2008) that there is no association among operational firm 
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performance and corporate governance rating as calculated by ROE and 
ROA. In addition, it is found by Bhagat et al. (2008) that no consistent 
association exists among measures of corporate performance and governance 
indices. Varshney et al. (2012) have constructed a corporate governance 
index which is founded on external and internal mechanisms of corporate 
governance. Thus, it is used to find out how the Indian firms' performance 
and corporate governance are linked. Also, it is measured by Economic 
Value Added (EVA), Return on Capital employed, Return on Net worth, and 
Tobin's Q. They found a positive relationship between CG and EVA, where 
they could not validate this relationship for the traditional performance tools-
RONW, ROCE or Tobin's Q. Korent et al. (2014) have formed CCGI® 
based on information and data collected from CG codex’s annual 
questionnaires (Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency, The Zagreb 
Stock Exchange, 2010). However, they stated that the CG practice by the 
firm explains the varying successful performances significantly for samples 
of company from the years 2008, 2009, and 2010. For the year 2007, by 
using the company sample, they found that anyone of the K=5 aspects of CG 
practices is not significant for justifying the varying company performances 
success. 
 Vintila and Gherghina, (2012) have examined, using governance 
indicators given by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), this 
relationship which includes corporate governance global measure as well as 
CG’s four sub-indices including Board Structure, Compensation, 
Shareholder Rights, and Audit. Subsequently, a negative correlation among 
firm performance and corporate governance global rating is established by 
their study. Furthermore, negative correlation between CG sub-indices and 
performance of firm was found by them, with some exceptions. Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick (2003), by making use of incidence of 24 governance rules, 
have been successful in building a ''Governance Index'' which will substitute 
for the level of rights of shareholder at an estimated 1500 large firms in the 
1990s. It was concluded by their study that firms having shareholder rights 
that are strong had more sales growth, greater firm value,  lower capital 
expenditures, higher profits,  and made lesser corporate acquisitions. 
Following the study conducted by Gompers et al. (2003), an entrenchment 
index established on six provisions was suggested by Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2009). They found "that increases in the index level are 
monotonically associated with economically significant reductions in firm 
valuation as well as large negative abnormal returns during the 1990–2003 
periods."    
 Hodgson et al. (2011) "investigate whether the Thai Institute of 
Directors (IOD) corporate governance index provides investors with 
financial information about fundamental value and arbitrage portfolio 
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decisions, and if/how information content changes over time." Thus, they 
found that financial proxies for performance of firms and "good governance" 
classification were significantly related. Silva and Leal (2005) have indicated 
that "less than 4% of Brazilian firms present ''good'' corporate governance 
practices and that firms with better corporate governance have significantly 
higher performance (return on assets)". Klapper and Love (as cited in Krafft 
et al., 2013) have used for 14 emerging countries and the firm-level data for 
374 firms. The key governance index used by them is the first 6 categories, 
mean, in the CLSA report. According to them, there is a high correlation 
between better corporate governance, greater market valuation, and 
improved operating performance. Subramanian (2015) has indicated that the 
performance of firm and corporate governance, calculated by means of 
profitability parameter, share a positive relationship. In addition, he indicated 
that increasing institutional ownership is negatively affecting the corporate 
governance practices in Indian State-owned Enterprises. 
 In summary, we can see that the previous studies produced different 
findings. The results regarding the association among performance of firm 
and CGI showed conflict. Thus, this study aims to examine this relationship 
and evaluates the performance of firm using ROA. Given that we don’t know 
the form of this relationship in the "SCL on ASE", the following hypothesis 
was drawn: 
H03: The corporate governance index for "SCL on ASE" doesn't 
affect firm performance in year 2010 and year 2015. 
 
Methodology 
The Population and Study Sample 
 Mainly the population of this study consists of all companies listed 
on ASE in the years 2010 and 2015. ASE consists of three main sectors, to 
be precise, industrial, financial, and the services sector. The list of companies 
listed on ASE during the period 2010-2015 was subject to changes according 
to the addition of some companies or the removal of some other companies. 
Therefore, the sample of the study was selected according to the following 
conditions: 1-The Company should be already listed on ASE at 31/12/2010 
and continued with normal operations until 31/12/2015. 2-The newly 
companies that were listed after 2010 should be excluded. 3-The 
discontinued companies because of acquisition, merger, or any other reason 
should be excluded from the list. 4-The financial sector, which comprises of 
banks, insurance, real estate, and other diversified financial services 
companies should also be excluded from the list. The reason for excluding 
these companies is that they had different kind of operation. Also, they are 
usually subjected to special regulations and, as such, they need different 
codes of corporate governance. 5-Availability of data and information for the 
European Scientific Journal November 2016 edition vol.12, No.31  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
340 
selected companies, especially the full financial reports. Sometimes, these 
reports cannot be found for different reasons. This is a normal problem 
especially in the emergent countries. Based on these conditions, the final list, 
as shown in Table 1, contains 97 companies of which 52 were industrial 
companies and the rest were services companies. 
Table 1. Numbers and classification of companies that constitute the sample of study 
Main sector - services Main sector- industrial 
Sub-Sector No. of Companies Sub-Sector 
No. of 
Companies 
 Health Care Services 4  Pharmaceutical and 
Medical Industries 
6 
 Educational Services 6  Chemical Industries 9 
 Hotels and Tourism 10  Paper and Cardboard 
Industries 
3 
 Transportation 10  Printing and Packaging 1 
 Technology and 
Communication 
1  Food and Beverages 8 
 Media 2  Tobacco and Cigarettes 2 
 Utilities and Energy 3  Mining and Extraction 
Industries 
9 
 Commercial Services 11  Engineering and 
Construction 
6 
    Electrical Industries 3 
    Textiles, Leathers and 
Clothing 
5 
 Total 47  Total 52 
 
Data Collection 
 To achieve the purposes of this study, it depended on secondary 
resources to gather data and information. This were collected from different 
sources available publicly, for example disclosure reports of other 
companies, annual financial reports of companies, websites for companies, 
Alerts or sanctions directed to companies, Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
databases (2016), and Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) databases (2016). 
 
Construction of the Corporate Governance Index for "SCL on ASE" 
 A corporate governance index has been built by Black et al. (2006) 
for 515 Korean companies found on a Korea Stock Exchange survey for year 
2001. They declared that a theoretical basis for assigning weights to 
subindices or to elements within subindices is lacking (Black et al., 2006). 
Reviewing the literature in this regard, we cannot find a scientific base for 
the construction of CG indices. Therefore, it is a diligent matter. 
 The Corporate Governance Index, in this study, has been built for 
Shareholding Company Listed on Amman Stock Exchange "SCL on ASE". 
In order to build the index, questions were outlined using the Corporate 
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Governance Code for "SCL on ASE" that is issued by the Jordan Securities 
Commission (JSC). Hence, this covers four major groups (sub-indices) as 
follows: 1-The Board of Directors of a Shareholding Company (BDoSC) 
including the following sub-groups: general points, Meetings of the Board of 
Directors, Tasks and Responsibilities, and Committees Formed by the Board 
of Directors. 2-General Assembly Meetings (GAM). 3-Shareholder Rights 
(SR) including two sub-groups: Rights included in the Jurisdiction of the 
General Assembly and General rights. 4-Disclosure and Transparency (DT) 
which also includes two sub-groups: the external auditor and the audit 
committee. 5- In addition to four sub-indices, a fifth twelve-element sub-
index was added for "Other General Items"(OGI) to capture the important 
elements included in the definitions in the CGC for ''SCL on ASE.'' Also, it 
aims to encapsulate a few internal-control problems. Looking from the 
perspective of a researcher, this sub-index should be added to give more 
power to the constructed index for ''SCL on ASE''. 
 At this instant, each general rule in the Corporate Governance Code 
for "SCL on ASE"   in each four group is constructed to have a value of one. 
In the constructed CGI, some rules have been divided into two or more sub 
items. In this case, the value of "one" is divided equally by all these sub 
items. Once again, the questions were submitted for answer in the form of 
yes or no. When the answer is in a positive status, then the item has a 
positive value and zero otherwise. Basically, this procedure was done for two 
reasons; first: the rule sometimes has two segments; one segment contains 
Imperative and General Items (I&G Items), whereas the other segment 
contains Guideline Items (G. Items). Second: the company sometimes 
complies with some items in the same rule, while it does not comply with 
other items in the same rule. Now, there is an exception for this procedure 
which is related to "Committees Formed by the Board of Directors." Here, 
the Nominations and Compensations committee has given 2.5 points 
distributed unequally on 8 items, just like the features applied to audit 
committee. On the other hand, the "Other General Items" (added to G. Items) 
was given 3 points in total divided by 11 items. 
 Furthermore, the full index contains 160 questions (items) having in 
total 112 points distributed between sub-indices as it shown in Table 2. The 
assigning of weights to the five components of governance are found out by 
dividing the full expected positive score of sub-group (max. sub-score) by 
the total expected positive score of all groups (max. score). According to this 
rule, the groups were given the following weights: BDoSC36.61%; (41/112), 
GAM8.04%; (9/112), SR24.11%; (27/112), DT28.57%; (32/112), and 
OGI2.68%%; (3/112). Thus, the final percentage for the sub-group is a 
product of multiplying the actual output score by the weight and the result, 
divided by the full score given for the same sub-group. These results could 
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also be derived by dividing the actual output score by 112. Therefore, the 
overall CGI has a ratio from 0% up to 100%. According to these procedures, 
the overall corporate governance index is constructed as shown in the 
following equation below: 
 CG1 = BDoSC + GAM + SR + DT + OGI 
 CG1: Corporate governance index for ''SCL on ASE". 
BDoSC: The Board of Directors of a Shareholding Company. 
GAM: General Assembly Meetings. 
SR: Shareholder Rights.  
DT: Disclosure and Transparency. 
OGI: "Other General Items". 
 
Table 2. Distribution of questions and points between sub-indices and descriptive statistics for years 
2010 and 2015   
Sub- Indices 
Theoretical Index 2010 2015 No. Q Points Mea
n S. T. S. T. Min. 
Ma
x. 
Mea
n SD 
Mi
n. 
Ma
x. 
Mea
n SD 
A- Board of 
Directors (BD)  53  41 .366 
.11
0 
.31
2 .217 
.03
2 
.18
8 
.37
1 .299 
.03
8 
 General items 
1
7  
1
2   
.03
4 
.09
5 .072 
.01
2 
.06
5 
.10
7 .089 
.00
9 
 
Tasks and 
Responsibilit
ies 
1
8  
1
7   
.02
7 
.12
1 .082 
.02
2 
.04
9 
.15
2 .112 
.02
6 
 
Committees 
Formed by 
the BD 
1
2  7   
.00
0 
.06
0 .026 
.01
2 
.02
5 
.06
7 .055 
.01
2 
 
Meetings of 
the Board of 
Directors 
6  5   .022 
.04
5 .037 
.00
6 
.03
1 
.04
5 .043 
.00
3 
B- General 
Assembly 
Meetings 
1
4   9 
0.08
0 
.02
5 
.06
5 .050 
.00
8 
.04
3 
.07
6 .056 
.00
7 
C- 
Shareholders 
Rights 
 27  27 0.241 
.17
0 
.22
3 .204 
.01
3 
.20
5 
.24
1 .221 
.00
8 
 General Rights 
1
4  
1
4   
.06
3 
.11
6 .096 
.01
2 
.08
9 
.12
5 .105 
.00
8 
 
Rights 
within the 
Jurisdiction 
of GAM 
1
3  
1
3   
.09
8 
.11
6 .107 
.00
4 
.11
6 
.11
6 .116 
.00
0 
D-Disclosure 
and 
Transparency 
 55  32 0.286 
.18
9 
.27
1 .233 
.01
5 
.22
3 
.35
5 .253 
.01
7 
 General items 
1
0  6   
.01
6 
.05
4 .037 
.01
0 
.02
5 
.05
4 .041 
.00
9 
 The Audit Committee 6  4   
.00
0 
.03
6 .024 
.00
6 
.00
9 
.03
6 .028 
.00
7 
 
Duties of the 
Audit 
Committee 
1
5  
1
3   
.08
9 
.11
6 .102 
.00
5 
.09
8 
.11
6 .109 
.00
5 
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Powers of 
the Audit 
Committee 
4  3   .013 
.02
7 .021 
.00
5 
.01
8 
.02
7 .023 
.00
4 
 The External Auditor 
2
0  6   
.04
0 
.05
4 .048 
.00
3 
.04
2 
.14
9 .052 
.01
0 
E- Other 
General Items  11  3 
0.02
7 
.00
7 
.02
7 
.019 .00
4 
.01
0 
.02
7 .021 
.00
4 
Overall CGI  160  
11
2    
0.72
3    
0.85
0  
 
 Finally, it is important to mention that there is no agreement on the 
structure of values or percentages of which can be judged on the quality of 
the index. For instance, what is the score that represent good score of CGI, or 
how much would be the high, medium, or low scores (percentages) in CGI. 
It is highlighted by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that for the advanced market 
economies also, a major disagreement exists on the quality level of the 
pervading mechanisms of governance. Actually, Bhagat, Bolton and Romano 
(2008, P.1803) have stated that "there is no one "best" measure of corporate 
governance". Black et al. (2003), based on the index that ranges from 0 to 
100, pointed that the better-governed firms have a higher scores. Whereas 
Nwakama et al. (2011, P.206) with similar index indicated that "the closer a 
firm’s value is to 100, the better its corporate governance status." In the 
researcher opinion, especially in Jordan case, to referred to the index as good 
corporate governance index, the company should, at least, have achieved or 
be in compliance with the imperative and general rules compared to the 
whole rules, namely: Imperative, General, and Guideline Codes in addition 
to "Other General Items." Consequently, according to this opinion, the good 
CGI for Shareholding Company Listed on Amman Stock Exchange ("SCL 
on ASE") should be more than 60.5% (the ratio of imperative and general 
rules (I&G) (67.82 points)) divided by the entire score (112 points). 
Table 3.  The weights of Imperative, General, and Guideline Codes with "Other General 
Items" included in CGI  
 I&G Items G. Items Total Score 
 Score Weights Score Weights Score Weights 
Board of Directors 18 0.161 23 0.205 41 0.366 
General Assembly 
Meetings 
6.17 0.055 2.83 0.025 9 0.080 
Shareholders 
Rights 
22 0.196 5 0.045 27 0.241 
Disclosure and 
Transparency 
21.65 0.193 10.35 0.093 32 0.286 
Other General 
Items 
- - 3 0.027 3 0.027 
Overall CGI 112 .605 112 0.395 112 1.000 
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Variables Definition  
 The variables of the study are expressed shortly as follows:  
 1-Corporate Governance Index: A comprehensive quantitative 
measures of corporate governance index is constructed for "SCL on ASE" 
which contains five sub-groups, namely: General Assembly Meetings 
(GAM), The Board of Directors (BDoSC), Shareholder Rights (SR), 
Disclosure and Transparency (DT), and "Other General Items" (OGI). This 
index is expressed as follows: 
 CG1 = BDoSC + GAM + SR + DT + OGI 
 2- Firm's value: Many of prior studies make use of Tobin’s Q as an 
alternative for the value of firm. Tobin’s Q was also employed by our study, 
and it is evaluated as given below: 
 
 Where: DEBT = book value of debt; MVE = market 
value of equity; BVE = book value of equity. 
 3- Firm's Performance: These are a group of indicators that can be 
used to measure the performance of firm such as ROA, ROE, ROI, and 
profitability. In this study, we used ROA as a measure of performance. 
However, this measure was taken directly from annual reports for the study 
sample, where it was calculated as follow: 
ROA = (Net Income + Finance Interests)*100 Total Assets 
 4- Control Variables: The following control variables have been 
used in this study:  
A. Financial leverage as evaluated using the debt ratio. 
B. Size of firm calculated using the logarithm of total assets. 
C. The largest shareholders possessing 5% or more of the total 
company’s shares. These shareholders are mostly represented by board of 
directors; therefore, it is expected that they affect the decision of exercising 
and disclosing the corporate governance. In this study, this variable was 
divided into two components, namely: biggest institutional shareholders and 
biggest Individual shareholders. 
D. The industry sector. In this study, this variable was taken at two 
levels, namely: general sectors (i.e. service sector and industrial sector) and 
sub sectors into general sectors. Therefore, there are 15 sub sectors in this 
study. 
 
Empirical Results 
The Quality of CGI for "SCL on ASE" 
 The researcher has stated previously, according to his opinion, that 
the good CGI for "SCL on ASE" should be more than 60.5%, which is the 
Tobin's Q = (MVE + DEBT) (BVE + DEBT) 
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percentage of score of imperative and general rules out of total theory score, 
i.e. a product of 67.82/112. Table 4 shows the percentage of actual scores in 
the years 2010 and 2015 in details and the total scores compared to the 
constructed total theoretical score. The results refer that the "SCL on ASE" 
have a good CGI in two years. The total percentages are 72.30% and 85% for 
years 2010 and 2015, respectively. The results also refer in general that the 
CGI in 2015 is better than CGI in 2010. 
Table 4.  The quality of CGI for "SCL on ASE" in years 2010 and 2015 compared to the constructed theory CGI 
score  
 Full Theory score 2010 2015 
 I&G G. T. 
Score 
I&G G. T. 
Score 
% I&G G. T. 
Score 
% 
Board of 
Directors 
0.161 0.205 0.366 0.123 0.094 0.217 59.29 0.155 0.144 0.299 81.69 
General 
Assembly 
Meetings 
0.055 0.025 0.080 0.043 0.008 0.050 62.50 0.048 0.008 0.056 70.00 
 Shareholders 
Rights 
0.196 0.045 0.241 0.175 0.029 0.204 84.65 0.190 0.031 0.221 91.70 
Disclosure 
and 
Transparency 
0.193 0.093 0.286 0.170 0.063 0.233 81.47 0.183 0.071 0.253 88.46 
Other 
General 
Items 
- 0.027 0.027 - 0.019 0.019 70.37 - 0.021 0.021 77.78 
Overall CGI 0.605 0.395 1.000 0.511 .213 0.723 72.30 0.579 0.275 0.850 85.00 
I&G: Imperative and General rules, G: Guideline rules 
%: is a percentage of actual score divided by total theoretical score. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 5 shows the variables’ descriptive statistics that are employed 
for the purpose of this study. The CGI’s mean is raised by 18.14% (from 
0.7231 in year 2010 to reach 0.8543 in year 2015), which indicates an 
improvement in practices of corporate governance. The companies’ size, 
given by logarithms of total assets, has increased by 0.08% which indicates 
increase of investment in these companies. Financial Leverage has also 
increased by 15.18% which support the increase of total assets. Ownership 
concentration has changed in two ways; biggest individual shareholders have 
increased by 7.4%, whereas biggest institutional shareholders have decreased 
by 1.17%. From the theoretical point of view, the increase of the control of 
individuals on the company should leads to improvements in the 
performance. In this study, the mean of firm value and firm performance 
have decreased by 15.63% and 49.14%, respectively. One possible 
explanation of these results is that the increase ratio of leverage exceeds the 
increase ratio of assets. This might place a big burden on the revenues, 
especially after the financial crisis. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. 
No. Variables Symbols Year Descriptive Statistics Min. Max. Mean SD 
1- Corporate 
Governance Index 
CGI 2010 .5763 .8562 .7231 .0472 
2- CGI  2015 .7242 .9752 .8543 .0496 
3- Tobin′s Q TQ 2010 .0291 3.6614 .9683 .7456 
4- TQ  2015 .0369 4.0190 .8170 .7835 
5- Return on Assets ROA 2010 -1.0311 .3551 .0232 .1389 
6- ROA  2015 -.4491 .3143 .0118 .1054 
7- Size (Log. of 
Total Assets) 
LgTAsst 2010 5.6915 8.9002 7.3351 .5744 
8- LgTAsst.  2015 5.8608 9.1083 7.3408 .6278 
11- Financial 
Leverage 
Leverage 2010 .0125 .9447 .3082 .2164 
12- Leveg.  2015 .0015 .9803 .3550 .2417 
13- Biggest 
shareholders- 
institutions 
BigInst 2010 
.0000 .9912 .3681 .2658 
14- BigInst.  2015 .0000 .9870 .3638 .2997 
15- Biggest 
shareholders- 
personal 
BigInd 2010 
.0000 .9550 .2058 .2289 
16- BigInd  2015 .0000 .9200 .2210 .2544 
17- Sector Sect  1 2 1.52 .502 
18- Sub-Sector SubSect  1 15 7.39 3.856 
 
 Tables 6 and 7 present the Pearson correlation for variables used in 
the study for years 2010 and 2015, respectively. These two tables show 
positive but weak relationships between CGI and all variables in two years. 
Subsequently, these relationships were positive with regards to relationships 
with size (LgTAsst), Leverage, BigInst in 2010, and the relationship with 
size in 2015. In addition, most of control variables have insignificant 
correlations with each other. From other side, the tables also show some 
significant correlations in two years. In 2010, a positive correlation was 
established between Tobin′s Q and ROA, where it is negatively associated 
with size and leverage. In 2010, ROA was also found to be positively 
correlated with the size and BigInst. In 2015, a positive correlation was 
established between Tobin's Q and BigInd, where it is negatively associated 
with leverage. ROA was also found to have a negative correlation with 
SubSect and a positive correlation with the size. 
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Table 6. Pearson Correlation table for year 2010  
Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 CGI 1         
2 Tobin′s Q .060 1        
3 ROA .123 .218* 1       
4 LgTAsst -.041- -.227-* .246* 1      
5 Leverage -.124- -.377-** -.008- .407** 1     
6 BigInst -.062- .141 .216* .186 .061 1    
7 BigInd .087 .180 .001 -.188- -.224-* -.594-** 1   
8 Sect .189 -.102- -.085- -.314-** -.020- -.061- -.059- 1  
9 SubSect .178 -.121- -.034- -.163- .102 -.027- -.118- .744** 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 7. Pearson Correlation table for year 2015 
Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 CGI 1         
2 Tobin′s Q .103 1        
3 ROA .007 .185 1       
4 LgTAsst -.017- -.162- .430** 1      
5 Leverage .089 -.384-** -.187- .330** 1     
6 BigInst .012 -.144- .065 .142 .053 1    
7 BigInd .135 .387** -.036- -.200-* -.164- -.545-** 1   
8 Sect .112 .040 -.152- -.343-** -.032- -.110- .131 1  
9 SubSect .091 -.072- -.212-* -.209-* .096 .016 .003 .744** 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
 Paired-sample t-test was employed in this study to test whether there 
is a difference between CGI for "SCL on ASE" in 2010 and 2015. In 
addition, to test the CGI effects and other explanatory variables for "SCL on 
ASE" in 2010 and 2015 on both firm value and firm performance, the 
technique of multiple regressions was used. Therefore, the results of testing 
the hypotheses H01 to H03 are as follow: 
 H01: There is no difference between CGI for "SCL on ASE" in 
2015 and 2010. 
 This hypothesis is aimed to know whether there is an improvement in 
corporate governance practice in year 2015 compared to year 2010. A 
paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare CGI for "SCL on ASE" in 
2015 and 2010. For the scores of CGI in 2015, the difference was significant 
(M=0.854, SD=0.050). For CGI in 2010 (M=0.723, SD=0.047) conditions, 
t(96)= -37.796, p<0.001. These results, which were provided in table 8, 
suggest that CGI for "SCL on ASE" has actually improved over time. This 
analysis has been repeated for sub-indices' in 2015 and 2010. As it can be 
seen from table 8, there were significant differences between all pairs of 
scores, which is consistent with the previous result.  
European Scientific Journal November 2016 edition vol.12, No.31  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
348 
Table 8. Results of paired-samples t-test 
Pair year 
Paired Sample 
Statistics Correlations   Test 
Mean SD Correlation Sig.   t Sig. 
CGI and 
CGI       
2010-
2015 
  .752 .000   -37.796 .000 
CGI-I&G 
and CGI-G       
2010   .258 .011   -79.803 .000 
CGI-G and-
G       
2010-
2015 
  .867 .000   -28.660 .000 
CGI-I&G 
and CGI-
I&G       
2010-
2015 
  .458 .000   -29.840 .000 
CGI-I&G 
and CGI-G       
2015   .190 .063   -69.327 .000 
CGI       2010 .723 .047       
CGI       2015 .854 .050       
CGI-I&G       2010 .511 .024       
CGI-G       2010 .212 .035       
CGI-I&G       2015 .579 .043       
CGI-G       2015 .275 .018       
 
H02: The corporate governance index for "SCL on ASE" doesn't 
affect firm value in year 2010 and year 2015. 
 The multiple regression model utilized to test what is the association 
among value of firm as evaluated using Tobin's Q and CGI is as shown 
below:  
 Tobin′s Q = 
αi+β1CGI+β2ROA+β3Size+β4Leverage+β5BigInst+β6BigInd+β7Sect+β8S
ubSect+ e … (1) 
 The outcomes of H02 hypothesis testing in years 2010 and 2015 are 
illustrated in Table 9. It is found that the CGI in two years, 2010 and 2015, 
does not significantly affect firm value. The outcomes of our study are 
coherent with Gherghina et al. (2014) study, which revealed that between the 
value of company and corporate governance ratings, there is no significant 
statistical association. From the other side, it is not consistent with many 
studies mentioned earlier in this study, which found that firm value 
positively affects good corporate governance practice. In year 2010, the 
control variables including ROA were found to significantly affect firm 
value with exception of sector and subsectors. In year 2015, two control 
variables were found to significantly affect firm values which are Leverage 
and BigInd. Therefore, what is unexpected in this result is that the size and 
ROA did not significantly affect firm value in year 2015. Therefore, Tobin′s 
Q has regressed against these two variables. The results, as shown in Table 
10, revealed that these two variables significantly affect the value of firm. It 
is clear by looking at the outcomes that the link among these two variables 
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and value of the firm is controlled by the other variables as well. Thus, this 
might not be of interest to the given study. 
Table 9. Results for regression for the effect of corporate governance index for "SCL on ASE" on firm 
value in year 2010 and year 2015  (controlled by ROA, size, leverage, BigInst, BigInd, and Sect and 
Subsect) 
 2010  2015 
 Coefficientsa  Coefficientsa 
 t- statistics Sig.  t- statistics Sig. 
CGI .184 .855  .837 .405 
ROA 1.978 .050  1.579 .118 
Size (LgTAsst) -2.036- .045  -.749- .456 
Leverage -2.412- .018  -2.549- .013 
BigInst 2.534 .013  .618 .538 
BigInd 2.122 .037  3.198 .002 
Sect -1.012- .314  .115 .909 
Subsect .119 .906  -.359- .720 
 R= .537; R2= .228; Adj. R2= .223  R= .538; R2= .290; Adj. R2= .225 
 F= 4.446;  P<.001  F= 4.491; P<.001 
a. Dependent Variable: Tobin′s Q 
 
Table 10. Results of regression for the effect of ROA and size on value of firm. 
 2010  2015 
 Coefficientsa  Coefficientsa 
 t- statistics Sig.  t- statistics Sig. 
ROA 2.939 .004  2.890 .007 
Size (LgTAsst) -3.016 .003  -2.745 .005 
 R= .363; R2= .132; Adj. R2= .113  R= .325; R2= .106; Adj. R2= .087 
 F= 7.120; P=.001  F= 5.562; P=.005 
a. Dependent Variable: Tobin′s Q 
 
 At detailed level as in equation 2, additional analysis was conducted 
to know whether CGI-I&G (imperative and general rules) and CGI-G 
(Guideline rules) have different effect on firm value in year 2010 and year 
2015. As shown in Table 11, we found the same results. Also, the CGI-I&G 
and CGI-G in two years, 2010 and 2015, did not significantly affect the firm 
value. 
Tobin′s Q = αi+β1CGI-I&G + β2CGI-
G+β3ROA+β4Size+β5Leverage+β6BigInst+β7BigInd+β8Sect 
+ β9SubSect+ e … (2) 
Table 11. Results for regression of the effect of the CGI-I&G and CGI-G for "SCL on ASE" on firm 
value in year 2010 and year 2015  (controlled by ROA, size, leverage, BigInst, BigInd, and Sect and 
Subsect) 
 2010  2015 
 Coefficientsa  Coefficientsa 
 t- statistics Sig.  t- statistics Sig. 
CGI-I&G  (imperative and 
general) 
.854 .396  -.047 .963 
CGI- G     (Guideline) -.337 .737  1.084 .281 
a. Dependent Variable: Tobin′s Q      
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H03: The corporate governance index for "SCL on ASE" doesn't 
affect firm performance in year 2010 and year 2015. 
 The multiple regression model utilized to test how the performance 
of firm was calculated using ROA is linked to CGI as shown as follows:  
 ROA = 
αi+β1CGI+β2Size+β3Leverage+β4BigInst+β5BigInd+β6Sect + 
β7SubSect +e … (3) 
 The results of testing of H03 hypothesis in years 2010 and 2015 are 
presented in Table 12. Thus, it was found that the CGI in two years, 2010 
and 2015, does not significantly affect firm performance. In year 2010, the 
size of firm and BigInst were found to significantly affect firm performance. 
In year 2015, two control variables were also found to significantly affect 
firm performance which includes size and Leverage. Earlier in this study, we 
have seen that the prior studies revealed different and conflicted findings 
about how the CGI and performance of firm are linked.  
Table 12. Results of Regression for the corporate governance index for "SCL on ASE" 
effect on performance of firm in year 2010 and year 2015 (controlled by size, leverage, 
BigInst, BigInd, and Sect and Subsect). 
 2010  2015 
 Coefficientsa  Coefficientsa 
 t- statistics Sig.  t- statistics Sig. 
CGI 1.210 .230  .512 .610 
Size 2.255 .027  5.660 .000 
Leverage -694 .490  -3.719 .000 
BigInst 2.421 .018  .273 .786 
BigInd 1.607 .112  .063 .950 
Sect  -.251 .803  1.213 .228 
Subsect .396 .713  -1.419- .159 
 R= .383; R2= .146; Adj. R2= 
.079 
 R= .570; R2= .325; Adj. R2= 
.272 
 F=2.181; P=.043  F= 6.119; P<.001 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
 Consequently, we have conducted an additional analysis, as it is 
drawn in equation 4, to know whether CGI-I&G and CGI-G have different 
effect on firm performance in year 2010 and year 2015. As it shown in Table 
13, we found that the two variables in two years did not significantly affect 
the firm performance. 
 ROA = αi+β1CGI-I&G+ β2CGI-
G+β3Size+β4Leverage+β5BigInst +β6BigInd +β7Sect+ β8SubSect 
+ e … (4) 
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Table 13. Regression results for the effect of the CGI-I&G and CGI-G for "SCL on ASE" on 
firm performance in year 2010 and year 2015  (controlled by size, leverage, BigInst, BigInd, 
and Sect and Subsect) 
 2010  2015 
 Coefficientsa  Coefficientsa 
 t- statistics Sig.  t- statistics Sig. 
CGI-I&G  (Imperative and 
General) 
.058 .954  -.936 .352 
CGI-V       (Guidline) 1.588 .116  .986 .327 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
 From the other side, Claessens (2006, P.103) stated that "Better 
corporate governance can add value by improving the performance of firms, 
through more efficient management, better asset allocation, better labor 
policies, or similar efficiency improvements." Therefore, the explanation of 
the previous results of H01 to H03 might need more analysis. When 
reviewing the value and performance of "SCL on ASE" after financial crisis 
in the period 2008-2010, we find important contradictory changes in the 
ROA and Tobin′s Q values that are linked to the total assets. Table 14 
presents the summary of the signs of changes that happened in 2015 in 
comparison with changes occurring in 2010. 
Table 14. Tobin′s Q and ROA values changes relating to total assets 
Change of Total Asset No. of Comp. % Tobin′s Q ROA Sign sign 
Increased 13 13.40 + + 
Increased 8 8.25 + - 
Increased 16 16.49 - + 
Increased 11 11.34 - - 
decreased 24 24.74 - - 
decreased 8 8.25 + - 
decreased 11 11.34 - + 
decreased 6 6.19 + + 
Total 97 100%   
 
Conclusion 
 Abroad Corporate Governance Index is built in this study. However, 
it contains 112 points which was classified under five major governance 
categories, namely; The Board of Directors of a Shareholding Company, 
General Assembly Meetings, Shareholder Rights, Disclosure and 
Transparency, and "Other General Items". The index was used to calculate 
corporate governance’s quality using 97 Jordanian service and industrial 
companies. In addition, the comparing analysis with the theoretical CGI 
score has reported that the "SCL on ASE" have a good CGI in two years, 
2010 and 2015. In addition, the study has investigated the improvement in 
the constructed Index. A significant difference was found in the CGI scores 
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for 2015 and 2010 suggesting that the CGI for "SCL on ASE" has improved 
over time, and it is better in 2015 than it is in 2010. 
 The study also investigated the association between CGI and firm 
value and firm performance. Consequently, Pearson Correlation has shown 
weak relationships between CGI and all variables in years 2010 and 2015. 
These relationships were positively correlated with the exception of the 
relationship with size, Leverage, the biggest institutional shareholders in 
2010, and the relationship with size in 2015. 
 The study also aimed to examine how CGI affects the value and 
performance of firm. The study revealed that the CGI in two years, 2010 and 
2015, does not significantly affect firm value as measured by Tobin's Q. It is 
revealed by these results that all the explanatory variables used in the study 
significantly affect firm value with the exception of sector and subsectors. In 
addition, the study revealed that CGI in two years, 2010 and 2015, does not 
significantly affect firm performance. In year 2010, the size of firm and 
biggest institutional shareholders were found to significantly affect firm 
performance. In year 2015, also two control variables were found to 
significantly affect firm performance, which include size and Leverage. 
Thus, one of the explanations of the previous results is the existence of 
contradictory changes in the values of Tobin′s Q and ROA which relates to 
total assets after financial crisis in the period 2008-2010. 
 Despite the results referred that the "SCL on ASE" have a good CGI, 
it still need more improvements. There is some inconsistence between 
Jordanian laws rules and some of corporate governance rules. Jordanian 
companies usually follow companies' law rules besides the other laws. 
Therefore, to reach better corporate governance, the interested Jordanian 
authorities may need to modify the inconsistency of these rules. 
 
Limitations 
 In building the corporate governance index employed by this study, it 
depends on secondary data, which were collected from various publicly-
available resources. The use of primary data such as interviews and 
questionnaires may be very useful and give more power to the constructed 
index. In addition, including other explanatory variables such as cultural 
issues and behavioral issues of investors might play a role in controlling the 
association among constructed CGI that is constructed and the performance 
and value of firm. 
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